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Abstract 
This article critically analyses the operations of the Criminal Records Bureau (‘the CRB’) and 
seeks to determine why the Bureau closed abruptly in December 2012. It questions whether 
the decision to open in March 2002 was expedient, in light of the apparent flaws in the 
operational assumptions made by Capita Plc, the successful bidder for the CRB contract, and 
the long-standing problems with the criminal records data. The article then identifies three key 
failings in the administration of the criminal records checks which it is submitted quickly and 
decisively eroded public and political confidence in the Bureau. The article concludes by 
considering who, if anyone, is responsible for the apparent failure of the CRB, and what lessons 
might be learned by the organisation which replaced it. 
 
Introduction 
The high-profile child abduction and murder of Sarah Payne in 2000, coupled with the Soham 
murders in 2002, saw a marked rise in public fear of ‘stranger-danger’.1 This caused a 
paedophile panic2 to set in which legitimised an exponential rise in the number of citizens 
subjected to criminal record checks; the figure had risen from 701,692 checks3 to 3.3 million 
between 1993 and 2008.4 All of this was administered by a newly created public-private body, 
the Criminal Records Bureau (‘The CRB’), which opened in 2002.5 Employers,6 voluntary 
groups7 and public figures8 roundly declared their support for the extension of criminal 
checking and proudly reported the depth and scale of their own vetting processes. The Court 
of Appeal overturned the common law presumption against the disclosure of non-conviction 
data9 and instead created a threshold test that non-conviction data should be disclosed ‘if it 
might be true’;10 a decision which further facilitated the proliferation of vetting. The tide in 
favour of ‘vetting everyone, everywhere’ seemed to be inexorable – by 2007 the phrase ‘CRB 
check’ had entered ordinary lexicography11 and a ‘vetting epidemic’ had set in.12 
                                                          
1 T. Thomas, ‘The One Stop Shop’ (2 March 2001) 151 NLJ 298   
2 A. Williams and B. Thompson, ‘Vigilance or vigilantes: The Paulsgrove Riots and policing paedophiles in the 
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All of which makes the last few years quite remarkable so far as criminal records in England 
and Wales are concerned. A backlash13 against the vetting epidemic seems to have developed. 
Politicians have rowed back from their previous ebullient support for the vetting epidemic; the 
rhetoric has become more nuanced and there has been explicit executive support for the scaling 
back of the vetting regime.14 Public attitudes seem to have hardened in the face of some of the 
more high-profile examples of pernicious checking, likely influenced by media reports of 
children’s authors being prevented from speaking in schools,15 and elderly flower-arrangers 
being barred from church,16 unless they undertook an enhanced CRB check Simultaneously, 
the judicial position has markedly shifted, with new tests established and new, more critical 
approaches to interpretation of the vetting framework adopted.17 
 
The most conspicuous example of this paradigm shift was the dissolution in December 2012 
of the Criminal Records Bureau. The decision to do so was taken without warning, was never 
fully explained by the Government and has attracted scant academic attention. This article aims 
to extrapolate a rationale behind that decision. It will do so by critically evaluating the 
operations of the Bureau with a particular focus on the mistakes made in its conception and 
administration and the public and political reaction to those decisions. Key failings in the 
operational execution of the CRB’s functions will be identified, along with the detrimental 
impact these caused on the public and executive perception of the Bureau and it’s workings. 
The author concludes by seeking to ascertain what lessons, if any, can be learned from the 
failure of the CRB for the organisation which immediately preceded it. 
 
Conception and teething problems 
On 14 December 1998, then Home Secretary Charles Clarke announced plans to open a new 
‘Criminal Records Bureau’ to be solely responsible for the administration of the new criminal 
record checks instituted by recent legislation. Clarke told Parliament that ‘dangerous people 
need to be stopped from working with children and young people. The creation of the CRB is 
an important step towards achieving that.’18 The Labour administration invited bids to run the 
Bureau as a public-private partnership with the Home Office19 and on 20 July 2000, it was 
announced that Capita had won the right to sell criminal records20 and a 10-year contract to do 
so was signed on 3 August 2000.21  
                                                          
13 T. Thomas, ‘Old Criminal Records Playing a Familiar Tune’ (2012) 176 JPN 539 
14 Theresa May, then Home Secretary, pledged in October 2010 to scale back vetting to ‘common sense levels’ 
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19 Home Office, Criminal Records Bureau – Outcome of the Timetable review, Press Release 441/1999 (16 
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20 Home Office, Capita wins competition for Criminal Records Bureau programme, Press Release 211/2000 (20 
July 2000) 
21 Home Office, Criminal Record Checks to Protect Children and Vulnerable Adult on the Way, Press Release (3 
August 2000) 
 
The problems mounted before the Bureau had opened for business. The principal concern lay 
with the raw criminal records data, which had been in an inadequate state for decades.22 It was 
originally intended that the CRB would open in July 2001, but a Parliamentary Select 
Committee was so concerned with the quality of the raw data that the start date was deferred 
until further investigations were made.23  
 
In July 2000, HM Inspector of Constabulary published a report on his review of the PHOENIX 
police database which contained the criminal records data24 and found incorrect recording, 
missing records, incorrect classification and an overall error rate of between 15 – 65% on 
inspected files.25 Such was the general concern that the Home Secretary addressed the issue in 
Parliament, telling the Commons that ‘the Home Office certainly does not have a defence 
against the charge that the police records system is seriously inadequate...This has been the 
case consistently for a very long period of time...It is a very bad state of affairs’.26 
 
Another grievous example of the problems occurred in June 2000 when the Home Secretary 
ordered an inquiry into the removal of 140,000 caution records from the Police National 
Computer.27 Indeed, such was the parlous state of the criminal record collection that Terry 
Thomas claimed there to be a real possibility of Enforcement Notices being served on the police 
by the Information Commissioner.28 The overall data concerns were effectively two-fold: 
‘many of those with past cautions may be able to obtain a clean bill of health while others may 
initially incriminate the innocent who must then seek to clear their names through a protracted 
administrative procedure’.29 
 
Delays and backlogs 
Against this backdrop, the CRB finally opened on 11 March 2002.30 It was overwhelmed 
almost immediately. The number of applications for checks far outstripped the capacity of the 
fledgling organisation’s ability to process them and by July 2002 there was a minimum six-
week turnaround time for certificate requests.31 There seemed to be an enormous backlog of 
applications: one report claimed that 206,153 requests for enhanced disclosures had been 
received between March and August 2002 but only 58,000 certificates had been issued.32 
 
                                                          
22 C. Baldwin, ‘The Vetting Epidemic in England and Wales’, (2017) J. Crim. L. 81(6), 478 – 496 at 482 – 3.  
23 The Home Secretary conceded that the criminal records data was ‘seriously inadequate…a very bad state of 
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27 Police lose 140,000 records (18 June 2001) The BBC 
28 T. Thomas, ‘The National collection of criminal records: a question of data quality, (Nov 2001) Crim LR 886 
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31 D. Hayes, Police Checks delays build backlogs in recruitment and fostering (18 July 2002) Community Care 
(issue 1431) 
32 Ibid. 
Against this chaotic opening, Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman were abducted near their home 
in Soham on 4 August 2002. On 17 August 2002, the caretaker of the local college, Ian Huntley 
was arrested and ultimately charged with their murder.33 Amid the subsequent frenzied media 
reporting of the Soham case,34 the Education Minister reacted by issuing guidance that all 
teachers must be CRB checked before the new school term.35 This opened a floodgate of fresh 
applications for which the already overloaded CRB was ill-equipped to cope. By August 24th, 
the BBC were reporting that 100 extra staff had been drafted in to help clear a backlog of 
100,000 unprocessed applications.36 News media broadcast footage of empty classrooms as 
children were sent home from school because teachers had not received their CRB certificates 
in time37 and hundreds of new teachers could not start work because ‘their ‘clearance’ had not 
come through’.38  
 
The Home Secretary David Blunkett intervened and sent in a team of troubleshooters, led by 
Patrick Carter, to investigate and resolve the crisis.39 Checks on those seeking to work with 
vulnerable adults were suspended until the backlog of teacher applications was resolved.40 
Blunkett told reporters that he was ‘concerned at the ongoing problems that have beset the 
CRB’ and was ‘determined that we will overcome these difficulties to ensure this vital new 
public service operates effectively’.41 The crisis concluded only when the Education Minister 
recognized that the problems were sufficiently grave that her only option was to retract her 
initial guidance. This was done on 4 September and new guidance, which instead permitted 
teachers to work after a List 99 check only, was published.42 
 
The respite was temporary. In October 2002, NHS management wrote to the Government to 
plead that the CRB prioritise checks on medical staff to alleviate serious understaffing issues 
caused by a backlog in processing the necessary CRB checks.43 Carter and his team reported 
back to the Home Secretary in December 2002 but although ten key recommendations were 
presented to Parliament in February 2003,44 ministers were criticized for refusing to publish a 
full report, citing commercial confidentiality, with one MP describing the decision as ‘an 
outrage’.45 One of the recommendations was to delay the implementation of the basic criminal 
checks until ‘CRB systems have been developed to provide a substantially greater capacity’. 
The Government agreed and postponed the introduction of the basic checks.46 The 
                                                          
33 R v Ian Huntley [2005] RWHC 2083 at [4 – 5]  
34 K. Hanley, ‘Pre-Trial Publicity: Press and Prejudice’ (15 March 2007) LS Gaz, 20 
35 W. Woodward and A. Naseem, School vetting crisis deepens (30 August 2002) The Guardian 
36 Concern over school staff checks (24 August 2002) The BBC 
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38 Above n.11 
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40 Above n.13 
41 Above n.35 
42 History of checks U-turns (4 September 2002) The BBC 
43 J. Booth, Crisis over vetting in children’s hospitals (20 October 2002) The Telegraph 
44 HC Deb 27 Feb 2003 c.33WS 
45 HC Deb 30 April 2003 c.114WH 
46 Above n.44 at c.35WS 
postponement lasted fifteen years: basic checks were only made widely available on 18 January 
2018.47 
 
Much of the problem stemmed from the application process. It had been presumed that most 
applications for checks would be made electronically, but in reality the CRB was ‘drowning in 
paper’: in April 2003 some 80% of applications were made in written form.48 This failure to 
recognize the likely preferred method of application was later attributed to a failure to properly 
consult with registered bodies prior to opening,49 or, as Edward Leigh MP bluntly put it, there 
was ‘not enough spadework done.’50  
 
Delays persisted. Questions asked in Parliament in June 2003 revealed that in its second six-
month period of operation, the CRB had processed only 19.4% of standard disclosure requests 
within one week and 52.4% of enhanced checks within three weeks (as against targets of 
95%).51 Paul Burstow MP lamented that ‘the system was not fit for purpose and was not ready 
to cope: it should not have gone live’52  
 
The backlog was not cleared in full until June 2003.53 Although delays persisted – in 2008 
£154,420.55 was paid ex gratia to 823 individuals who had lost earnings as a result of delays 
in processing checks54 and a total of 3,733 complaints were received relating to delay55 – by 
February 2004 the Bureau was meeting its operational service targets. It was doing so however, 
at least in part, by amending the targets themselves: 92% of enhanced checks (against a target 
of 90%) were being processed in four weeks, though the previous target had been a three-week 
turnaround. The processing time for standard checks was doubled, from one-week to two-
weeks, and the target of 95% reduced to 90%.56 
 
Capita made a series of critical assumptions in developing the operational processes of the 
CRB. It failed to recognise that employers would likely prefer to send applications in batches, 
rather than individually. It also failed to recognise that there would be seasonal peaks in 
applications, particularly in summer when new teachers were recruited.57  
 
Most damaging of all, however, was the error in presuming that the majority of applications 
for checks would come by telephone and electronically, rather than in paper form. Capita had 
assumed that 85% of applications would be made by telephone and that the majority of the 
                                                          
47 News Story – New DBS basic check service goes live (18 January 2018) Disclosure and Barring Service Online  
48 Above n.45 at c.103WH 
49 Criminal Records Bureau – Delivering Safer Recruitment? (12 February 2004) The National Audit Office 23 
50 Criminal checks agency criticised (12 February 2004) The BBC 
51 HC Deb 3 June 2003 c.137W 
52 Above n.45. at c.108WH 
53 Above n.49 at 15 
54 HC Deb 18 December 2008 c.1073W 
55 Ibid. at c.1074W 
56 Above n.49 at 34 
57 Ibid at 23, para.3.13 
remainder would be made electronically. It therefore built a call-centre based system, rather 
than anything that might support paper-based applications.58  
 
This mistake stemmed from a clear failure to conduct proper market research prior to opening. 
It was only in the early months of 2001 that Capita held roadshows with some 5,000 
participants to test out the application process and these made it apparent that the majority 
preference among registered bodies would, in fact, be for paper applications. By this time, so 
far as Capita were concerned, it was largely too late – the call-centre was in place and the IT 
system, which did not support keying in data from paper forms, was already largely in situ and 
there was no realistic prospect of creating a new system if the ‘go-live’ date was to be met.59 
The position was simple – either the opening of the Bureau was delayed again, likely exposing 
Capita to substantial criticism, or they took the risk and opened.  
 
Capita chose the latter and walked headlong into a major furore, played out in full view of the 
public, courtesy of extensive negative media reporting. When the roadshow predictions came 
to pass, and 80% of applications came in paper form, the CRB was simply unable to cope. It 
had spent millions of pounds building a system which was entirely incompatible for their 
customer preference. Had Capita done its research properly, and used it better to influence their 
decision making, they could have corrected their assumptions and prepared accordingly. They 
didn’t, and so instead the CRB ‘drowned in paper’ and faced a barrage of criticism for it. 
 
It is possible, however, that the CRB may have recovered from this auspicious beginning had 
events entirely out of their control not overtaken it. The revelation that the alleged perpetrators 
at Soham both held positions at education establishments60 sparked a political storm and caused 
various ministers to make reactive pronouncements and policy decisions which inevitably 
resulted in a deluge of new applications for checks. This deluge came at a time when the CRB 
was already facing its first peak period for applications – the late summer lead to the new school 
term.  
 
When the Bureau predictably failed to cope, it resulted in a widespread public backlash, fuelled 
in large part by rabid media reporting. Headlines portraying ‘a crisis’ and scenes of ‘chaos’ 
appeared routinely.61 Even when the majority of backlogged claims were processed, every 
subsequent delay was deemed newsworthy and generated further negative headlines.62 This 
continued for around six months and did untold damage to the reputation of the Bureau. 
 
In many respects, the Bureau was an unfortunate victim of the crisis which engulfed it in the 
summer of 2002. For it to have to deal with the inevitable aftermath of a high-profile murder 
of two schoolgirls by school employees was, so far at the CRB was concerned, an extremely 
                                                          
58 Ibid. at 22 
59 Above n.49 at 2, para.8 
60 Huntley’s accomplice, Maxine Carr, was a teaching assistant at the school attended by both victims. See M. 
Bichard, The Bichard Inquiry Report, HC653 (22 June 2004) 23 – 24.  
61 For example P. Johnson, Crisis team for school vetting shambles (7 September 2002) The Telegraph.  
62 A. Travis, Probation officers left off vetting list (28 December 2002) The Guardian.  
unfortunate and untimely happenstance. It might be argued that they would have been better 
placed to cope had they taken more research-based operational decisions, but it is submitted 
that even a fully operational, paper-based application system would have struggled under the 
weight of hundreds of thousands of new, urgent applications for checks.  
 
Moreover, the initial policy decisions which created the chaotic flood of applications were not 
theirs. They were Executive decisions taken by ministers, who made them without consulting 
the organisation which would be charged with administering them or without properly 
considering whether the already stretched Bureau could cope. The Education Minister, Estelle 
Morris, knew that the CRB was struggling to cope even before the Soham crisis emerged; in 
May 2002 she had complained to the Home Secretary about the delays then being faced by 
teachers awaiting checks.63 Yet in her eagerness to be shown to be acting decisively, she failed 
entirely to consider the practical ramifications of her directive that all teachers must be vetted 
before starting work. She should have known that there was no realistic prospect of the CRB 
being able to process hundreds of thousands of applications in the two weeks between Soham 
and the start of the new school term. 
 
She must, therefore, take her share of the responsibility for ignoring those issues and making 
knee-jerk decisions which attempted to appease public anger but ultimately inflamed it. Morris 
recognised her failings and resigned in October 2002, telling Parliament that she ‘had not done 
as well as she should have done’.64 The Bureau might have considered itself unfortunate that 
media and public anger was largely turned against it, rather than Morris and the other ministers 
whose ill-conceived decisions overburdened it. 
 
Rising costs 
It had been anticipated that each application should cost £13.10 to process, yet the real cost to 
Capita was £33.50 for standard and £38.50 for enhanced certificates.65 It was clear by 2003 
that the cost to applicants would need to be increased to help cover this significant shortfall 
and legislation was passed to increase the cost of a standard check to £24 and £29 for enhanced 
checks.66  
 
This was a very significant price rise: both had previously cost £12. A Standing Committee 
was convened to consider the increase and ultimately approved it (by 9 – 6 majority), though 
one member said that ‘it is obvious that we are considering a failed institution that needs 
remedial action. Who will bear the burden of that action? It appears that customers and 
taxpayers will have to bail out the flawed project…That is scandalous’.67 Another added that 
‘the CRB is a monopoly, and it has been incompetently run. All the estimates have been 
                                                          
63 Above n.35  
64 Education secretary resigns (25 October 2002) The BBC Online  
65 Above n.52 
66 Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) (Amendment No. 4) Regulations 2003 (S.I., 2003, No. 1418) 
67 Tenth Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation, Wed. 9 July 2003 c.3 
hopelessly wrong, and it has been a shambles’.68 The ‘shambles’ saw Capita fined £1.8 million 
by the National Audit Office (‘the NAO’) in February 2003.69 
 
A further NAO report in February 2004 showed that the Bureau would not break even until 
2005/6 and that the taxpayer was funding a shortfall of £68.2m.70 The cost of checks was 
increased again in April 2004, to £28 and £33, to help reduce the financial deficit.71 Another 
fine, of £1.9m, was levied by the NAO for ‘failure to meet service levels from February 
2003’.72  
 
While Capita were being fined by the NAO, they were concurrently receiving significant sums 
from the public purse. A Commons Committee of Public Accounts was convened in 2004 to 
investigate the spiraling costs of running the Bureau. It emerged that Capita had originally bid 
£250m over ten years to run the Bureau – almost £130m less than PriceWaterhouseCooper’s 
unsuccessful bid – but that this was predicated on an application process which would be 85% 
call-centre based.73 As shown above, those predictions proved entirely flawed, and John 
Trickett MP described the accompanying costs-estimates as ‘hopelessly optimistic’.74  
 
Capita needed more money and asked the Government to provide it. It was eventually agreed 
that they would be paid £400m, rather than £250m, over the life of the contract75 for what 
Richard Bacon MP described as ‘a slower service that is delivered a year late and it provides 
less than did originally’.76 This led the Committee to conclude that this was ‘one of the most 
incompetently let contracts this committee has seen…We got the highest tender rather than the 
lowest in the end’.77  
 
Parliament eventually also approved a supplemental payment of £3.6m ‘for the unexpected 
overload of paper applications.’78 In the fiscal year 2004/5, the CRB posted an operational 
deficit of £8m which once again was ‘rectified’ by public money.79 The revised break-even 
target of 2005/6 was ultimately missed: the Bureau recorded an operational deficit for the 
fourth successive year, albeit a much reduced one at £2.2 million.80 It was not until 2007, when 
it recorded a £13.6m surplus, that the CRB finally became self-funding.81 
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71 Ibid. 
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73 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Criminal Records Bureau: delivering safer recruitment? 
HC453 28 October 2004 Ev.4 
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77 Above n.73 
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It is submitted that the costs spiral which consumed the CRB in its first five years was driven 
by three key factors. The first was the aforementioned failure of Capita to conduct proper 
research before developing and instituting operational systems. Capita’s original tender was 
costed on the creation of a call-centre based application process which was almost entirely 
rejected by its intended market as soon as Capita proposed it to them. The Bureau then spent 
years, and tens of millions of pounds of taxpayer’s money, trying to rectify its error by 
converting its operations to a paper-based system.  
 
At a time when it was struggling to emerge from the backlog crisis, the revelation that Capita 
was in receipt of public money to rectify problems created by their own failure to properly 
anticipate the preferred means of applications clearly had the potential to cause more 
reputational harm to the Bureau. Media reporting, which included an article describing the 
funding amendments as part of ‘a package of urgent measures designed to put the troubled 
CRB back on track’82 and another which opened with the headline ‘£19m bailout to rescue 
criminal records office’,83 likely further exacerbated the damage.  
 
The second key factor was the Government’s decision to allow charities free access to criminal 
checks.84 Whilst a well-intentioned (and vote-winning) measure, the financial ramifications of 
that decision were obvious – in 2004/5 alone the CRB issued half a million free certificates 
which cost the Bureau £17m in administrative fees and lost revenue.85 In a year when the 
Bureau posted a deficit of £8m, that lost revenue would have been sufficient to negate the 
necessity of a public fund injection. 
 
The third, and perhaps most telling, factor which resulted in significant cost deficits was the 
Bureau’s inability to issue ‘basic’ certificates. The decision, taken by the Government in the 
wake of the backlog crisis in 2002, was certainly justifiable so far as the need to control the 
flow of applications at a time when the CRB was struggling to cope with numbers. It is, 
however, unlikely that the Government needed to wait until January 2018 to finally begin 
processing basic checks and, in doing so, it effectively changed the terms of its contract with 
Capita and denied them access to a significant revenue stream.  
 
The basic check is designed to provide details of all unspent convictions recorded against an 
applicant.86 They are also designed to be suitable for any applicant whose 
employment/voluntary position does not involve regular or unsupervised contact with children 
or vulnerable adults.87 As the majority of employment in England and Wales does not require 
contact with children or vulnerable adults, it might be presumed that the basic checks would 
outnumber the other checks and, it is submitted, quite substantially. With one of (if not the) 
principal anticipated revenue streams unavailable to it, it is perhaps unsurprising that the CRB 
                                                          
82 A. Travis, Criminal Vetting for all who change jobs is axed (28 February 2003) The Guardian.  
83 R. Ford, £19m bail out to rescue criminal record office (6 June 2003) The Times.  
84 See C. Baldwin, The Vetting Epidemic in England and Wales (2017) J. Crim. L. 478 at 487  
85 Above n.79 at 5 
86 Per s.112 Police Act 1997 
87 Above n.49 at 9 
found itself requiring Government payments and significant price increases to balance the 
books in the first five years.  
 
Two of these three factors were outside of the control of Capita. Once more, it is perhaps fair 
to suggest that the CRB can count themselves somewhat unfortunate that they were adversely 
affected by decisions taken outwith their control. The harshness of this was made more 
manifest by the subsequent negative public, press and political reaction to the inevitable price 
increases which focused solely on the Bureau and which took a too superficial approach when 
a more in-depth extrapolation was merited. 
 
One final issue should be noted. By insisting upon a self-funding, public-private CRB, the 
Labour administration effectively presented the Bureau a stark choice. Either prices be 
increased indefinitely to cover running costs or the volume of disclosures had to increase to 
such a point that sufficient revenue is generated.  
 
It is submitted that, in reality, that choice was a pyrrhic one. Prices can only be raised until a 
tipping point is reached and employers become discouraged from making applications on cost-
prohibitive grounds. The only realistic option, therefore, was to increase the volume of criminal 
checks. This was not an accidental happenstance. One of the performance measures by which 
the CRB was assessed from its inception was the volume of disclosures produced: indeed every 
CRB annual report since the first commented upon it. In 2006-7, for example, the annual report 
provided that: ‘the CRB is now self-funding…Undoubtedly the continuing increase in 
disclosure volumes had been a significant factor. Large elements of the agency’s costs are fixed 
and as volumes have increased each disclosure’s share of these fixed costs has decreased’.88 
This allowed the price of applications to stabilise and in turn encouraged more applications. 
 
The Government’s insistence on a self-funding Bureau, which actively encouraged the CRB to 
widen its influence in an attempt to increase volume of applications, deliberately facilitated the 
vetting epidemic in England and Wales.89 
 
Errors and omissions 
As has been shown, concerns were raised as to the likely accuracy of the certificates to be 
issued by the CRB prior to the ‘go-live’ date. These predominantly related to the paucity of the 
data held on the Pheonix police database which would be used for checks. The condition of the 
data was so concerning that the Information Commissioner singled it out for particular criticism 
in her first annual report, stating that ‘substantial improvements’ were required if the CRB was 
to be a success.90 The Policy and Data Sources manager at the CRB stated that: ‘we fully 
recognise and share the concerns that have been expressed about delays in inputting data onto 
the Police National Computer and about incomplete data and inaccuracies. The problem needs 
to be tackled’.91 
                                                          
88 Above n.81 at 6 
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90 R. Huseyin, ‘The Commissioner’s Annual Report’ (1 September 2001) PDP 1 8 (3) 
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There simply wasn’t enough time. Almost inevitably, mistakes were made on certificates as 
soon as the CRB started issuing them. Initially the Bureau attempted to blame these made by 
applicants on their forms, claiming that these resulted in errors being made,92 but there was no 
such excuse in September 2002 when the CRB was forced to admit that it had sent criminal 
record checks to the wrong employers. The Association of Colleges, whose members had 
requested checks on their staff, told the BBC that they had received checks on social care and 
NHS staff instead and were so perturbed that they had reported the issue for investigation by 
the Information Commissioner.93  
 
In the same month a former primary school headteacher was awarded £2,500 in compensation 
from West Midlands police after a CRB check wrongly showed that he had been previously 
convicted of an indecent assault of his stepdaughter. It transpired that he didn’t have a 
stepdaughter and that he had been mistaken for a man who shared his name and date of birth 
but who did have a criminal record.94 
 
By 2003, Capita boasted that they had processed around 1,000,000 applications and had an 
error rate of ‘just’ 1%. In a resulting Parliamentary debate, one MP noted that Capita’s claims 
may ‘sound very reassuring’ but when the total number of checks carried out totals more than 
one million in the given period this ‘means that 10,000 people were wrongly assessed. Those 
people were either certified as no threat when they are, which is extremely serious for the 
people they are working with, or assessed as being a threat when they are not, which is 
extremely serious for the applicants and the people who wish to employ them’.95  
 
Time did little to dissipate the problem of inaccurate or erroneous disclosures. In April 2004, 
an answer to a written Parliamentary question from Mark Oaten MP revealed that in the 
preceding twelve months, some 193 applicants were wrongly labelled as offenders.96 
Responding to the now stock Home Office defence that mistakes were made in only ‘a tiny 
proportion’ of checks, Oaten told the press that: 
 
This is another example of the shambolic state of affairs at the CRB. Every single 
mistake of this kind made by the CRB is extremely serious and it is not acceptable for 
the Home Office to dismiss this as a minor issue. These mistakes can make a massive 
difference to people's career prospects when they are wrongly labelled as criminals.97  
 
It is arguable that, at this embryonic stage of the Bureau’s existence, the issue of mistakes and 
omissions, whilst controversial and widely reported, remained somewhat in the background as 
compared to the issues of delay and increasing costs. However, when those matters began to 
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subside as the backlog was eliminated and the Bureau became self-funding so that the cost of 
checks stabilized,98 the issue of erroneous certificates became the focal point for criticism.  
 
Academic criticism began to surface – in 2005, for example, Jan Miller reported that around 
one-third of employers had complained that CRB checks provided inaccurate information.99 
The issue caused consternation in Parliament again in April 2006 when Mark Oaten repeated 
his earlier Parliamentary question and the subsequent response revealed that a further 1,472 
erroneous certificates had been issued since his last request in March 2004.100 The BBC 
reported that once such incident saw one woman refused a job with a charity after a check 
mistakenly identified her as a convicted shoplifter101, while The Guardian bemoaned ‘the 
defamation of 1,500 innocent public servants’.102  
 
A further question in Parliament in June that year showed that the total number of upheld 
complaints relating to mistaken disclosures since the CRB’s opening to the end of the 2005/6 
financial year to be 2,273.103 The Government response was emphatic: one minister baldly 
declared that ‘the CRB must err on the side of caution when an individual has the same or very 
similar personal details to those of someone who has a criminal record. This is because it is 
better to be safe than run the risk of letting an inappropriate person through’.104 
 
This ‘cautious’ approach continued to disrupt lives and cause significant individual hardship. 
In 2007, the media reported that one woman had lost two jobs and was currently suspended 
from a third after her CRB check continued to show, incorrectly, that she had drink-driving and 
drug-related convictions.105 In 2008 it was reported that 680 checks had been issued which 
implicated innocent people in criminal offences.106 A CRB spokesman repeated the excuse 
provided the year prior by the minister, stating that ‘the Criminal Records Bureau's first priority 
is to help protect children and vulnerable adults, and we will always err on the side of caution 
to help ensure the safety of these groups’.107 One shadow minister retorted that ‘ Nearly 700 
mistakes that could ruin people's lives is 700 too many. There is an emerging crisis of public 
confidence in the handling of this public information’.108  
 
That crisis deepened in December 2008 when it emerged that the CRB had been somewhat 
selective in the figures they had released to that point and, in fact, the number of disputes which 
had resulted in an amended certificate were significantly higher than previously claimed. An 
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answer to a Parliamentary question revealed that in 2007/8, 2,785 disputes as to accuracy of 
information on a certificate had resulted in an amendment and that the total number of similar 
amendments since 2002/3 was actually 12,255.109 These figures included disputes regarding 
‘soft’ disclosures on enhanced certificates and cases of mistaken identity.110 Helen Hart argued 
that ‘given the scale of the operation, it is inevitable that mistakes will be made’111 but Lord 
Marlesford disagreed, declaring to the House of Lords that ‘the much vaunted system of 
Criminal Records Bureau checks seems to have descended into farce and chaos’.112 
 
There appeared to be no resolution to the now perennial problem of inaccurate CRB checks. In 
2009 the CRB issued 1,570 erroneous certificates – either checks which showed convictions 
against applicants who had none or which declared a person free from convictions when they 
had in fact been so convicted.113 In 2010, one article noted that ‘the CRB has been criticised in 
the past for…mislabelling 2,700 people as criminals during checks’.114 In February 2011 the 
Information Commissioner was involved once more in criminal records after Gwent Police 
mistakenly sent 10,000 CRB checks by email to a journalist. Staff involved were disciplined 
and new internal procedures were drafted by response.115 In 2012 it was reported that a 
Freedom of Information (FOI) request had revealed that the total number of disputes to date 
which had successfully queried the accuracy of a disclosure was now 19,551 and that ‘in at 
least 3,000 cases the police record of an entirely different person was passed on while more 
than 3,500 people discovered their entries on the police national computer (PNC) were 
inaccurate’.116 A further FOI request later that year showed that in the previous five years, 
£1.9m had been paid in compensation to those adversely affected by an inaccurate 
disclosure.117 
 
The deficiencies in the raw criminal data, known and lamented for nearly twenty years prior, 
were such that it was almost inevitable that mistakes would be made and, indeed, mistakes 
were made. These errors caused public and political confidence in the CRB to erode it’s 
inception.  
 
In one significant respect, the criticism was misdirected. The CRB were never the legal 
custodian of the criminal records. They were merely the agency authorised to access the PNC 
and disseminate checks. The records are the property of the Police,118 and the responsibility for 
the unsatisfactory state of the data must, therefore, lie solely with the applicable police forces. 
It is perhaps fortunate for them that the blame was largely lain almost entirely with the CRB, 
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and unfortunate for the CRB that they found themselves publicly scapegoated for the failings 
of the Police.  
 
However, it is submitted that the responsibility for making the demarcation clear lay with the 
CRB, and they rarely made the case with sufficient force as to mitigate the errors made. Indeed, 
in the main they instead they chose to take a bright-line approach of ‘caution’ where ambiguity 
arose and defended the thousands of errors made on that basis.  
 
This was a grave misjudgement. By taking such an approach they allowed the press to lead 
with headlines which showed the CRB in the worst possible light, referring to ‘blunders’ and 
‘criminalising innocent people’. The Bureau may have been able to survive this had they been 
in a position of relative strength, but against a backdrop of several years of negative press 
regarding delays and increasing costs, the CRB position appeared remarkably arrogant and 
wholly misaligned. 
 
This mistake was seized upon by the media, who took the opportunity to report copiously the 
many personal stories of individuals who found themselves wrongly tarred with criminality. 
This allowed an extremely destructive narrative to build whereby (sometimes excusable) errors 
became catastrophic mistakes, ruining the lives of innocent people. This inevitably caused 
significant reputational damage to the CRB and, as the reported number of affected persons 
rose, the narrative and subsequent damage increased to almost unmanageable levels. 
 
Ultimately, the CRB retreated behind bare statistics to defend themselves against charges of 
criminalising innocent people. The criminalisation of one innocent individual is wrong. To 
criminalise thousands is reprehensible. It is submitted that defending such a charge on the 
grounds of ‘caution’ caused fatal damage to the reputation of the Bureau. 
 
The Disclosure and Barring Service 
In March 2012, the CRB reached its tenth birthday. It did not reach an eleventh. As part of their 
commitment to reforming criminal records procedures, the coalition Government introduced 
the Protection of Freedoms Bill119 into Parliament in February 2011. An amendment was made 
to that Bill so that by May 2011 it included provisions for the creation of a ‘Disclosure and 
Barring Service’ (‘the DBS’),120 whose function would include the transfer of all roles 
undertaken by the Independent Safeguarding Authority.121 The Bill also provided that the 
Home Secretary may enact delegated legislation to transfer the functions of the CRB to the 
DBS if s/he wished.122 The Bill received Royal Assent on 1 May 2012.  
 
The Government had a decision to make. It’s 10-year contract for the CRB with Capita was 
almost expired and due for reconsideration. On 3 October 2012, Capita announced that it would 
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not be granted a new contract.123 On 29 November 2012 the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
(Disclosure and Barring Service Transfer of Functions) Order 2012 was approved by 
Parliament. Coming into force on 1 December 2012, this order dissolved the ISA and 
transferred its entire jurisdiction to the DBS124 and, by Part 3. Chapter 1, also transferred all 
CRB obligations under Part V of the Police Act 1997 to the DBS.125 The DBS, a non-
departmental public body, opened on 1 December 2012126 and is now ‘the main agency… 
carrying out employment vetting by reference to criminal records’.127 The contract lost by 
Capita was ultimately awarded to Tata Consultancy Services, who formally took over from 
Capita on 12 March 2014.128 
 
Conclusions 
By January 2013 the Criminal Records Bureau had been closed. Since its inception it had 
conducted over 21 million criminal record checks.129 It’s demise was not lamented: in January 
2013 Thomas commented ‘So, farewell then, Criminal Records Bureau and your ubiquitous 
CRB checks’.130 
 
Why did the Government choose to close the Criminal Records Bureau? The question is an 
important one in the modern vetting narrative; firstly due to the critical importance that the 
CRB has played in the development of the vetting epidemic in England and Wales, and 
secondly because there was no immediate rationale for closing it down – certainly there was 
no pressing reason why the ISA couldn’t have been merged into the CRB or why the CRB 
couldn’t have continued under a different operator once the contract with Capita had expired. 
 
It is clear, with the benefit of hindsight, that the CRB was not ready to ‘go live’ and therefore 
should not have opened in March 2002. The deficiencies of the raw data should have resulted 
in a postponement until they were rectified. It opened because there was tremendous pressure 
for it to do so. The Police Act had passed into law in 1997 and since that time there had built a 
significant political groundswell in favour of opening and for vetting generally. By 2001 the 
position at Westminster was that ‘those working with children or vulnerable adults will need 
to obtain a certificate showing that they have no criminal record’.131 This political objective 
could not be achieved until the CRB was opened and, with the start date already postponed 
from July 2001 due to concerns over the data quality, political patience was beginning to wear 
thin.  
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Capita was also under pressure from employers and voluntary groups. The expansion of vetting 
proposed under Part V of the Police Act 1997 had been supported vociferously by employers 
and particularly charitable organisations, many of who had been lobbying for access to criminal 
records since the late 1980’s.132 By 2002, with the prospect of free access to certificates in the 
offing, charities particularly were putting considerable pressure on the Government and on 
Capita to start issuing checks, while the position of employers was that ‘most employers would 
like to know if their staff or prospective staff have criminal records’.133 Moreover, by the end 
of February 2002, in accordance with agreed protocol, the Police had stopped processing 
applications for criminal record checks.134 It is not surprising, therefore, that Capita opened the 
CRB before it was properly ready to do so. 
 
Having opened before it should, the CRB then found itself engulfed in controversy. At least a 
proportion of this was of its own making. Although it was unfortunate that the Soham murder 
led to a flurry of applications, the fundamental errors made in its operational assumptions meant 
it was wholly unprepared for the backlog of applications which arose at a time when delay was 
unacceptable to the public, the press and Westminster. The incident damaged its standing in 
it’s infancy, and it is arguable that the Bureau never really recovered. 
 
With its reputation damaged, the Bureau then embarked on a drive towards self-sufficiency 
which led to significant price increases and payments from the Government to cover budget 
deficits. These were played upon by politicians and the press, who used the earlier backlog 
issues as justification for further attacks which, although somewhat superficial, further 
negatively impacted the public perception of the CRB and reinforced the presumption that the 
Bureau was ‘in crisis’. 
 
Although the Bureau achieved its self-funding aims and stabilised costs, it continued to face 
criticism for errors made on certificates issued. The fault for those errors lay predominantly 
with the Police, who maintained the raw criminal record data, but the CRB failed to make this 
demarcation clear and instead justified the errors on the basis that they were a tiny proportion 
of the overall vetting volume and that caution was preferred in ambiguous cases. This laid the 
Bureau open to the grievous charge of criminalising innocent people and stories emerged of 
individuals whose lives were ruined by inaccurate disclosures. 
 
When faced with the opportunity to dispose of the Criminal Records Bureau, the Government 
chose to do so when it had no pressing legal or operational need to do so. Perhaps the Home 
Office formed the view that the ‘CRB brand’ had become toxic and should be consigned to 
history. It would be hard to disagree: in light of the negativity which had enveloped it and 
helped to undermine it’s important work since it’s operations commenced, the decision was 
perhaps an understandable one. Will Tata and the Disclosure and Barring Service avoid making 
the mistakes that led to its predecessor’s demise? Time will tell. 
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